Most U.S. federal grants are allocated through arguably obsolete formulas, leading fast growing states to contend that they are not receiving their fair share of such grants. We examine this issue by analyzing the allocation of formula and non-formula grants during the period 1978-2008. We find that states with fast growing populations are penalized in the allocation of formula grants, whereas for non-formula grants population dynamics does not play a significant role. The estimated losses are sizable and heavily concentrated among the three fastest growing states -Nevada, Arizona, and Florida. Nevertheless, the majority of the U.S. states benefit from formula allocation, thus providing a plausible explanation for the status quo bias in budgetary formulas.
the design of such formulas is a powerful tool through which states' representatives try to "bring home the bacon" (Levitt and Snyder, 1995) . 2 Another striking feature of formulas is their long lasting life. The statutory matching formula of Medicaid, which is the largest formula grant program, has basically remained the same since the inception of the program in 1965. The Federal Highway program (the second largest formula program) is still administered via the formulas legislated in the Federal Highway Act of 1956.
The status quo can be advantageous for states that already receive a generous share of federal grants. In such cases, rules reducing the flexibility of the budget can serve pork-barrel objectives by preventing spending reallocations. As a result, formulas can represent a powerful instrument for preserving the status quo. The issue of status quo bias in formula legislation is well known; for example, it was clearly spelled out in the opening statement of Sen. Bob Packwood (chairman of the Committee on Finance, 104th Congress) in a 1995 Senate Hearing on the Medicaid distribution formula. 3 In the same Senate hearing, the failure of the Medicaid formula to respond to the needs of the states was also acknowledged. 4 But as of today -when the reform of Medicaid proposed in the "Medicaid Improvement and State Empowerment Act" is among the most hotly debated issues in Congress -the issue of the funding formula remains open. 5 The same holds true for the Federal Highway program, for which recent legislation -known as the "Highway Fairness and Reform Act of 2011" -introduced by Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchinson (Texas), proposes that states should be allowed to opt out of the Federal Highway program to circumvent the negative effects of the formula penalizing states with fast growing needs.
The controversy surrounding the reform of Medicaid and the Federal Highway program, which between 1978 and 2008 represented on average 30 percent and 10 percent of total federal aid, respectively, is neither new nor unique. As pointed out by a recent report issued by the GAO (GAO, 2009) , about 84 percent of federal aid is allocated through formulas, which in various ways prevent reallocations of the federal budget in 2 For a comprehensive survey of the literature on the economic and political determinants of intergovernmental transfers, see Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) and Weingast (2009) . 3 In his opening statement, Sen. Packwood states, "I am well aware that when it come to formulas, in Senators' -or Representatives' -home State and turf is often infinitely more important than substance. And matters get decided not on merits but on whether you can figure out a formula that will get you 30 states in the Senate… But unfortunately if two or three of those states that you lose are New York and California it gives you many problem in the House when the formula division comes up" (Medicaid Distribution Formula, Hearing before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, One Hundred Fourth Congress, First Session, July 27, 1995, p. 1). 4 According to Sarah Jaggar, Director of Health Financing and Policy Issues, "… wide disparities seen in the States' Medicaid programs demonstrate that the formula is not working as intended. For example, in fiscal year 1994, the number of people covered in Nevada Medicaid program represented 61 percent of the State's poverty population, while Vermont's population covered by Medicaid equaled 139 percent of its poverty population" (Medicaid Distribution Formula, Hearing before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, One Hundred Fourth Congress, First Session, July 27, 1995, p. 3) . 5 The full text of legislation introduced in the Senate (S.1013) and House (H.R. 2013) in May 2011 is available from the Library of Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov.
response to the changing needs of the states. The latter are often associated with rapidly growing population and, according to the same report, "... grant funding may be affected less or entirely unaffected by changes in population" because of specific formulas prescriptions such as hold harmless provisions, caps, floors and ceilings (GAO, 2009, p. 2) . The two most important formula programs (Medicaid and the Federal Highway programs) provide emblematic examples of such restrictions. Moreover, the GAO report notes that formula based allocations typically rely on out-dated population data which penalize states where the population changes at a fast pace. Several representatives of fast growing states have repeatedly voiced their concerns about the negative consequences of budgetary inertia: "sticky" budgets fail to respond to the rapidly changing needs associated with their fast growing population. The dissatisfaction of fast growing states with the existing mechanism of federal budget allocation culminated with legislation known as the "Fair Share Act," introduced in Congress be tween 1989 and 1993 by representatives of Florida, Arizona, and California. 6 Yet, these concerns seem to have gone unaddressed, as shown by the recent debate surrounding the approval of the stimulus package under the "American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009," which once again is reported to have penalized fast growing states in the allocation of important spending programs. 7 Does budgetary inertia penalize fast growing states? Although widely debated among legislators and policy practitioners, this issue has been surprisingly overlooked by the scholarly literature on federal budget allocation to the states. This paper aims to fi ll this gap, by empirically investigating whether fast growing states are disadvantaged in the allocation of formula grants and quantifying the size of such loss. To that end, we use Census data on per capita federal grant allocations to the states during the period 1978-2008, which allows us to isolate formula and non-formula programs, in particular the two most important formula items, Medicaid and the Federal Highway program.
Before empirically investigating the link between population dynamics and spending, it is important to clarify the relationship between spending per capita and population. As shown by Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) , (henceforth AW), when publicly provided goods exhibit a certain degree of non-rivalness, the per capita cost of their provision decreases with population size, thus implying an inverse relationship between optimal 6 The text of the bill introduced in the House and Senate explicitly states, "The Congress finds that there are significant shifts in the United States population between each decennial census; use of decennial census in allocating Federal funds to States unfairly penalizes States where the population is growing, and because the intent of Federal grant programs is to distribute funds fairly to States based on their relative population, it is more appropriate to use annual population estimates produced by the Bureau of the Census for these purposes (Fair Share Act of 1989 , 1992 , and 1993 per capita provision and population. However, as we show in the theoretical framework outlined in Section II, when the financing of quasi-public goods is governed by formulas, then under (over) provision occurs if the actual population is larger (smaller) than the one used by the formula. Therefore, in addition to an inverse relationship between spending per capita and population size due to the partial non-rivalness of publicly provided goods, we will also observe a negative relationship between spending per capita and population dynamics due to formulas. As a result, only by estimating the separate effects of population size (the scale effect) and population dynamics (the change effect), can we establish whether fast growing states are "unfairly" penalized in the allocation of the budget. To this end, in our empirical analysis, we use an index of population dynamics, along with state population, which allows us to separate the change effect from the scale effect.
Our empirical investigation provides strong evidence of a negative relationship between population dynamics and per capita federal aid to the states, which is mainly driven by formula programs such as the Federal Highway and all other formula programs excluding Medicaid, where we do not find evidence of a population dynamics effect. On the other hand, the dynamics of income per capita has a negative, significant impact on Medicaid per capita allocations. Since, during the period we consider, Federal Highway and other formula programs (except Medicaid) represent on average a combined 57 percent of grants allocated by formula, we conclude that states whose population grows fast tend to be penalized in the allocation of the majority of formula grants.
We also find that the distortions associated with population dynamics tend to be permanent, unevenly distributed across states and, for the most penalized states, sizable. The budgetary gains and losses implied by our estimates are such that 17 of the 48 U.S. continental states -whose population grows faster than the U.S. average -lose federal grants to the advantage of the remaining 31 states that grow at a slower pace. The most penalized state (Nevada) suffers on average a loss equivalent to 41 percent of the state average per capita federal aid allocated by formula, and the loss is as high as 39 percent for the Federal Highway program. The distribution of budgetary losses is quite uneven among losing states, since the three fastest growing states (Nevada, Arizona and Florida) bear almost 76 percent of the total loss, whereas gains -which benefit the majority of the states -are more evenly distributed. States on the losing side are a minority both in the Senate and in the House, which can partially explain the lack of responsiveness of Congress to the requests of fast growing states penalized by formula allocations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the main features of the grant formulas. Section III analyzes the relationship between per capita spending and population. Section IV reports descriptive evidence of the relationship between population dynamics and federal spending. Section V outlines the empirical model and presents our main results. In Section VI we carry out several robustness checks. Section VII speculates on the reasons for the persistence of suboptimal formulas and Section VIII examines which states are gainers or losers from current policies. Section IX concludes.
II. FEDERAL GRANTS: FORMULAS AND BUDGETARY INERTIA
Federal aid to the U.S. states is largely administered by formulas legislated in Congress. Between 1983 and 2008 , spending on formula grants amounted on average to 70 percent of total federal aid. This include the two largest federal programs -Medicaid and the Federal Highway Program -representing respectively 45 percent and 15 percent of grants allocated by formula during the same period.
One advantage of formulas is that they reduce arbitrariness in the allocation of the federal budget. However, their effectiveness in promoting a "fair" distribution of federal funds has been increasingly questioned by legislators and policy practitioners. The most controversial aspect of formulas is the rigidity they introduce in budgetary allocations. In particular, as pointed out by a recent GAO (2009) report, formulas tend to reduce the responsiveness of the budget to the changing needs of the states with rapidly growing population for two reasons. First, yearly allocations are typically determined using outdated population data. 8 Second, formulas can prevent budgetary adjustments because of rigidities embedded in their design. Those include hold-harmless provisions, which guarantee that the funds allocated to a state will be no less than a specified proportion of a previ ous year's funding. 9 If a population change results in a decrease in funding that would fall below some minimum amount, then the hold harmless provision raises the amount to a fixed minimum level. At the same time, the amount of the increase is deducted from the funding of other states not affected by the hold-harmless provision. In an analogous way, caps impose a limit on the size of an annual increase as a proportion of a previous year's funding so that, if a population change produces an increase in funding above a certain amount, the cap would limit its effect. Floors and ceilings operate in slightly dif ferent ways, but have similar implications -if a change in population reduces funding below the floor, the state would be guaranteed the amount specified by the floor, whereas if the allocation exceeds the ceiling, the state cannot receive more than the ceiling amount. The two largest formula programs, Medicaid and the Federal Highway, are affected by these sorts of rigidities. For example, the share of Medicaid spending financed by federal government -the so called Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) -is determined according to a statutory matching rate computed according to the following formula: (1-0.45) (state income per capita/U.S. income per capita) 2 .The FMAP is computed one year before the fiscal year in which it is effective, using a three-year average of the most recently available income per capita data from the U.S. Department of Commerce (GAO, 2007) . Moreover for Medicaid, the statutory rate of state spending reimbursed by the federal government (FMAP) operates under floor and ceiling restrictions (with a statutory minimum and maximum of 50 percent and 83 percent, respectively). The Federal Highway program, which consists of several programs that are mainly allocated by formula taking into account various measures of "needs," such as vehicle miles, lane miles, and population (U.S. Department of Transporta tion, 2007), is also subject to statutory state minimum spending constraints. For example, the annual apportionment from the Highway Trust Fund to the Surface Transportation Program is subject to statutory 0.5 percent minimum rate for states having less than a specified threshold of qualifying roads, vehicle miles travelled on those roads, and taxes paid into the fund (GAO, 2009).
The above described features of formula grant programs lead to several important questions. Do formulas distort allocations in favor of states with limited population dynamics? And are the distortions mainly due to the use of outdated population data or to other formulaic rigidities, such as hold harmless provisions, caps, ceilings, or floors? To address these issues, we first illustrate with a simple theoretical model how formulas can distort allocations. Next, we empirically assess whether fast growing states are disadvantaged in the distribution of federal grants and explore which mechanisms are the most likely drivers of budgetary inertia.
III. EXPENDITURE PER CAPITA AND POPULATION
Publicly provided goods often exhibit a certain degree of rivalness (quasi-public goods), which affects their provision. As shown by AW, the optimal provision of nonrival goods implies a negative relationship between spending per capita and population size, which stems from the presence of fixed costs and the resulting economies of scale associated with the provision of public goods. To illustrate the relationship between optimal spending per capita and population, we carry out a very simple exercise extending AW to allow for (1) a different degree of rivalness in the publicly provided goods, and (2) a financing rule that may introduce inertia in spending by linking current spending to past population levels.
As in AW, consider a country composed of N > 1 identical individuals with constant elasticity of substitution utility functions,
is the amount of the publicly provided good consumed by an individual, α ≤ 0, and N t is the population in period t, with t = {0, 1}. The function f (N t ), with 1/N t < f (N t ) < 1 and f ′ > 0, expresses the degree of rivalry of G and captures the quasi-public nature of the good. 10 The government at t = 1 chooses the level of provision of the quasi-public good by maximizing the objective function
Notice that the only difference between individual utility and the government objective function is given by the parameter γ , which creates a wedge between the preferences of the government and those of the representative individual, because the government, instead of using the current population level (N t ) in its objective function, uses the past value (N 0 ). The parameter γ is thus a reduced form representation of the various factors that can create "inertia" in spending. Clearly, if the population does not change (N 0 = N t ), then the use of a funding rule based on past population has no effect and γ = 1. On the other hand, when population grows (N t > N 0 ), then γ < 1, implying that the individual consumption of the publicly provided good taken into account in the government maximization problem (i.e., G/[ f (N t )N 0 ]) is larger than the actual individual consumption (i.e., G/[ f (N t )N t ]). The opposite holds if the population decreases (γ > 1).
Assume that each individual is endowed with an exogenous income Y and pays a lump-sum tax, which is used to finance the provision of the quasi-public good G/N t . The individual budget constraint is then given by
The maximization of the government objective function (1) taking into account the budget constraint (3) leads to the following per capita provision of the quasi-public good
From (4), expenditure per capita depends negatively on the popu lation growth captured by the term N t /N 0 (the change effect) and on the degree of non-rivalness, 1/f(N t ) (the scale effect). Note that when population does not grow (N t = N 0 ), individual and government preferences coincide. In this case, the maximization of the government objective function leads to the per capita provision
which, as in AW, depends negatively on the non-rivalness of the provided good. On the other hand, if N t > N 0 , the financing rule based on past population produces a per capita provision G * /N t < G ** /N t , since N t /N 0 > 1: the larger is population growth (i.e., the larger is N t /N 0 ), the larger is the distortion induced by the funding formula, for given non-rivalry level f (N t ). Finally, it is instructive to consider two polar cases. If the good is a pure public good ( f (N t ) = 1/N t ) with N 0 = N t , we obtain the same optimal per capita spending as AW, i.e., G*/N t = Y [1 + (N t ) α/(α -1) ] -1 , and per capita expenditure is negatively related to the actual population. On the other hand, if the good is private ( f (N t ) = 1) and N t > N 0 , then the optimal provision is G*/N t = Y [1 + (N t /N 0 ) α/(α -1) ] -1 , and per capita expenditure is negatively related to the actual population index. Moreover, in this last case, when N t = N 0 , the optimal per capita provision becomes G * /N t = Y/2, which is independent of population.
To sum up, our simple theoretical framework shows that a funding rule based on past (rather than current) population, decreases (increases) per capita provision when population grows (decreases) beyond the amount that would be justifi ed by the partial non-rivalness of the publicly provided good. Notice that, for simplicity we have illustrated the working of a formula distorting allocations by linking current provision to past population. The same sort of ineffi ciency would arise under any other formula that prevents allocations from reflecting actual population levels via other mechanisms (such as state minimum, floor, and ceiling restrictions).
The implication of our simple theoretical model for federal spending per capita in the U.S. states is that population size may have a negative effect on per capita spending (as long as publicly provided goods are partially non-rival), but population dynamics should not affect spending unless some funding mechanism (like formulas) implies that current provisions do not correctly reflect current population, letting the population dynamics term N t /N 0 (the change effect) emerge in (4) distinctly from 1/f (N t ) (the scale effect). From an empirical point of view, identifying these two determinants is crucial to understanding the extent to which expenditure does not match needs due to population growth. 11 Next we analyze the empirical relationship between per capita grants allocations and population across U.S. federal states to disentangle the effect of population size and population dynamics. 11 Our simple model with one jurisdiction can be easily extended to incorporate two symmetric jurisdictions i = {1,2}, each providing a local public good G i with positive spillovers on the other jurisdiction. In this case the optimal provision of the local public good (
where β > 0 denotes the positive spillover (i.e., the share of the public good provided in one jurisdiction enjoyed by the other). Note that without spillover ( β = 0), the optimal per capita provision coincides with (4). Thus, without spillovers, our simple theoretical framework with one jurisdiction captures the same features of a model with multiple jurisdictions. On the other hand, the presence of spillovers ( β > 0) reduces the optimal provision of the local public good within each jurisdiction. Since the sign of the spillover effect goes in the same direction as the population index, by omitting spillover effects from our empirical analysis, we may overestimate the extent to which fast growing states are penalized in the allocation of the federal budget. However, estimation results reported in Table A1 of the online appendix show that the inclusion of spillovers as a further control variable does not affect our main results.
IV. POPULATION DYNAMICS AND FEDERAL GRANTS IN THE U.S. STATES
During the period we consider , U.S. states varied substantially in their demographic characteristics. 12 This is particularly true for population dynamics. To capture the latter, we construct an index of population dynamics by dividing the population of every year, N t , by the population of the first year of our sample, N 0 , and then multiplying it by 100. Hence, in the base year (1978) the index (index_ pop) is equal to 100 for all states, and in subsequent years it measures the deviation of the state population from the base year. In the upper panel of Figure 1 , we present the geographic distribution of the average index_ pop for the 48 U.S. states during the period 1978-2008. It is clear that states display very distinct patterns, and population growth is heavily concentrated in the West and Southwest, and in three states to the Southeast (Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina).
How does federal aid respond to population dynamics? Some preliminary insight can be gained by constructing for spending in grants an index analogous to index_ pop, which is given by the ratio of state grants per capita in any given year and the grant per capita of the base year (1978), multiplied by 100. In the lower panel of Figure 1 we represent the average grant spending index by state during the period 1978-2008. The negative correlation between the upper and lower panels of Figure 1 is quite striking, as states with the fastest growing populations are typically characterized by the slowest growth of real per capita grants. This type of evidence, though quite suggestive, is not suffi cient to conclude that fast growing states are unfairly penalized in the allocation of federal grants. Remember that for quasi-public goods the optimal per capita provision is inversely related to population size. However, if allocations are affected by inertia, then rapidly growing population can lead to sub-optimal per capita allocations. It is therefore important to separate scale effects due to population size from change effects due to population dynamics. The existence of a negative relationship between spending per capita and population size would simply indicate the existence of non-rivalry in the consumption of publicly provided goods. On the other hand, a negative relationship between spending per capita and population dynamics would imply that allocations are distorted because they do not reflect actual population levels.
V. GRANT ALLOCATIONS AND POPULATION DYNAMICS
The purpose of this section is to use regression analysis to investigate whether states with a fast growing population are penalized by the budget allocation process. To this end, as indicated by our theoretical model, we need to disentangle the effect of population size from its dynamics, where the latter is captured by the population index (index_ pop). Hence, our first step is to estimate the following regression 13 The vector Z st includes real income per capita, the unemployment rate, the percentage of poor, the percentage of non-white population, the percentage of elderly, and the percentage of children. The vector T st consists of federal and state political variables that could influence the allocation of federal grants (Larcinese, Rizzo, and Testa, 2006) . The federal political variables include the share of votes for the incumbent president at the last election, the extent of "swing voting," measured by the standard deviation of the Democratic vote (as a share of the total of Democratic and Republican votes) in the last three presidential races, and a measure of election closeness, namely the average distance between the two main presidential candidates in the past three elections. The state political variables include the share of Democratic representatives in the Senate and the House of each state, the governor's party affi liation, age, term limit status, and whether she belongs to the same political party of the president, or the majority party in the House, or in the Senate.
The summary statistics of all variables are reported in Table 1 .
The focus of our empirical analysis is on the allocation of total grants, formula and non-formula grants, and the two major formula programs, Medicaid and the Federal High way Program. The data on formula and non-formula grants, Medicaid, and the Federal Highway program are Census data from the Consolidated Federal Fund Report (CFFR), which contains data on federal grants allocation to the states on an obligation base, starting from 1983. Since the distinction between formula and non-formula grants is not readily available from the CFFR, we use the information provided by the Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA) to identify formula programs. Formula grants are defined in the CFDA as "allocations of money to States or their subdivisions in accordance with distribution formulas prescribed by law or administrative regulation, for activities of a continuing nature not confined to a specific project." Both formula and non-formula programs in the CFDA are identified by the same codes used in the CFFR. Hence, by matching the information from the CFDA with the spending data from the CFFR, we have classified federal aid into two categories, formula and non-formula grants. Table  2 provides descriptive statistics of formula and non-formula programs by state. The amount of funds allocated by formula is on average always larger than the corresponding non-formula amounts for all states (except Wyoming). During the period 1983-2008, 70 percent of federal aid was allocated via formulas (Table 2) . Non-formula grants consist mainly of project grants that provide funding for specific projects (such as fellowships, scholarships, research grants, training grants, planning and construction grants) for fixed or known periods.
In Table 3 we report our baseline estimates. In columns (1) and (2), we use total grants as a dependent variable. The difference between the two is that in column (1) we use data from various editions of the Statistical Abstract covering the period 1978-2008, while in column (2) we use 1983-2008 data from the CFFR. Columns (3) and (4) distinguish between formula and non-formula programs.
The main pattern emerging from the results reported in Table 3 is that population dynamics are key to explaining the allocation of formula programs, whereas nonformula programs are not affected. We also fi nd that scale effects do not generally play a significant role, as a mostly insignificant coeffi cient of the population term indicates. 14 These results hold independently of whether we use fixed effects in our specification (Table 3A and 3B). In particular, the coeffi cient of index_ pop is negative and statistically significant for formula grants (Table 3A , column 3), whereas for non-formula programs (Table 3A , column 4) we do not find a statistically significant effect. However, it should be noted that the introduction of fixed effects improves the significance of the index_ pop coeffi cient for formula grants (Table 3B , column 3), as well as for total grants, for which we find a statistically significant effect of population dynamics (Table 3B , columns 1-2). This suggests that the estimated negative impact of population dynamics for overall grants is primarily due to formula-based programs, and that excluding fixed effects generates a downward bias in the estimated coeffi cients.
In the last column of Table 3 , we carry out a falsification exercise using federal transfers to individuals from the Food Stamp Program, which is close to a pure private good and is not allocated by formula. In this case, we expect not to observe any effect of population, neither in terms of scale nor in terms of change. Our estimates (with and without fixed effects) confirm our expectation that population does not affect the allocations of food stamps to the states.
VI. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
The estimated coeffi cients of Table 3 (with and without fixed effects) show that popula tion dynamics plays a crucial role in explaining the allocation of formula grants to the states since fast growing states receive significantly less than shrinking ones. However, in addition to factors that limit the responsiveness of spending to population dynamics, budgetary inertia might also be related to other factors. In particular, population dynamics may not be the only variable to which spending does not respond promptly, because allocations may also react slowly to the change of other important economic and demographic variables such as income per capita, poverty rates, population age, and ethnic group composition. If the growth of these variables is correlated with population dynamics, their omission may constitute a problem for the identifi cation of the population dynamics effect.
To take into account these concerns, in the first three columns of Table 4 we repeat the baseline regressions of Table 3 and add as further control variables several new indexes (that have been constructed analogously to index_ pop) measuring the dynamics of income per capita, the share of poor, of non-white ethnic groups, of population between age 5 and 17, and of population over age 65.
As we can see from the results reported in Table 4 (columns 1-3), the conclusions we reached in Table 3 are not altered by the inclusion of further indicators. In particular, the coeffi cient of index_ pop remains insignificant in the non-formula regression (column 3), whereas the estimated index_ pop coeffi cient for total grants (column 1) and formula programs (column 2) remains negative, statistically significant and sizable. As before, we do not find evidence of a statistically significant scale effect.
Having established the existence of a fundamental difference between formula and non-formula programs, we move next to the analysis of the two most important formula programs, Medicaid and Federal Highway. 15 In column 4 of Table 4 we report the results for the Federal Highway regression, where the estimated coeffi cient of index_ pop confirms the existence of a negative and statistically significant relationship between population dynamics and Federal Highway spending.
The results concerning Medicaid are quite different. As we can see from the estimated coeffi cients reported in column (5) of Table 4 , there is no statistically significant relation ship between Medicaid and population dynamics. This is not surprising since the share of Medicaid spending financed by the federal government is determined according to a statutory matching rate (FMAP) computed according to the following formula: (1-0.45)(state income per capita/U.S. income per capita) 2 .Thus, index_ pop could only have a very indirect impact via the income per capita measure used in the FMAP formula. On the other hand, income dynamics has a positive and significant coeffi cient, implying that states whose income grows rapidly are advantaged in the allocation of Medicaid federal funds. As we will explain later, this is problematic given that the goal of Medicaid should be to provide more funds to states that are less able to fund it with their own resources.
Note also that the only other instance of a significant estimated effect of income dynamics occurs for formula programs (Table 4 , column 2). However, once we exclude Medicaid from formula programs (Table 4 , column 6), the coeffi cient of income dynamics for Non-Medicaid spending is insignificant, thus implying that the effect of income dynamics in formula grants is driven by Medicaid. On the other hand, the coeffi cient of population dynamics for Non-Medicaid spending remains significant. If we consider an 
VII. POPULATION UPDATING AND FORMULAIC RIGIDITIES
As previously explained, the negative relationship between per capita spending and popu lation dynamics may be driven by (1) the use of outdated population data within formulas; and (2) formulaic rigidities due to rules such as hold-harmless provisions, caps, floors, and ceilings. Distinguishing between these two types of inertia is important because the first originates from a pure information problem, which may be addressed when updated data become available from the Census. In contrast, the second type of inertia does not allow the use of the most recent information on population, even if available. This implies that distortions in spending tend to be permanent and hence cumulate over time. In the following we try to assess empirically the importance of these two channels of inertia by using the fact that new Census information becomes available every 10 years. If the use of outdated population data were the only source of inertia, then the distortion would be corrected in each census year, and the negative effect of population dynamics would become evident over time in years between censuses. Hence, we construct a population index by census decade (index_ pop_decade), measuring population growth with respect to the population of the last census. At the same time, if rigidities embedded in the formulas' structure play a role independently of the use of outdated data, then the cumu lative effect of population dynamics -captured by our index of population dynamics with respect to the first year of the sample -should still have a significant effect on spending. 16 Significance improves for all the other regressions if we drop Louisiana and Mississippi for 2006 (see Table A2 in the online appendix); the same happens for the regression results reported in Table 3 (which are available from the authors upon request). 17 In Table A1 of the online appendix, we also report a specification showing that our results are robust if we include: (1) a lagged dependent variable to account for the fact that budgetary provisions tend to be determined by marginal changes to previous ones; (2) the mean of the transfers received by the neighboring states to account for the possibility that its own transfers are affected by neighbors' externality transfers;
(3) the state tax base per capita to account for the fact that states with growing population may need less federal transfers because they have a growing tax base; and (4) population density, which may might matter for how rival the goods are. All regressions in table A.1 use instrumental variables where, following the methodology of Besley and Case (1995) , neighbors' spending has been instrumented by using neighbors' political, demographic, and economic variables.
To assess the relative importance of the two channels of inertia, we re-estimate the regression of Table 4 , using index_ pop_decade alone (Table 5A , columns 1-5) and then in conjunction with our original population index (Table 5A , column 6-10). The negative effect of our original population index remains significant, whereas the index measuring the effect of population dynamics within each census decade is never significant. Even though the update of population data may not be suffi cient to completely eliminate the distortion in spending, the release of census data might still attenuate the cumulative effect of inertia captured by index_ pop during the census year and its aftermath. For this reason we carry out a further robustness check by introducing in the specification of Table 5A an interaction term between index_ pop and a dummy variable that is equal to one during the census year and the year after the census, and zero otherwise. However, the results reported in Table 5B indicate that the interaction term index_ postcensus is never significant.
VIII. SUBOPTIMAL FORMULAS?
Our analysis suggests that formulas are explicitly designed to reduce the responsiveness of budgetary allocations to states' population growth. This finding raises two important questions. First, why should legislators devise formulas with this specific intent? Second, how harmful is this rigidity for the states? Concerning the first issue, the non-rival nature of certain publicly provided goods might provide a rationale for the divergence between spending and population growth. In the case of pure public goods, an increasing number of people can be served at no additional cost, so it is not optimal to increase total spending when population grows. The construction of an integrated federal highway system could well constitute a case of public good provision. But, more generally, the rationale behind a formula should depend on the nature of the good provided. Given that most publicly provided goods and services are unlikely to be pure public goods, our simple theoretical model indicates that formulaic rigidities could lead to under-provision. For two specific formula programs -Medicaid and the Federal Highway -we have more precise information on their goals to evaluate the optimality of current formulas. The Medicaid program was established in 1965 to provide proportionately more federal funds to the states with high poverty rates and weak tax bases in ordere to reduce differences among states in their ability to fund Medicaid services. 18 For that purpose, its financing was based on a matching formula (still in place), whereby states with lower average per capita income receive higher rates of federal reimbursement for program costs. However, as pointed out by the GAO (2007) , the matching formula does not seem to be serving such programmatic goals, since state disparities are instead widening. According to the same report, two factors play an important role in explaining this outcome. First, the Medicaid formula relies only on state income per capita, which does not accurately measure either states' total available resources or the cost of providing health care to people in need and the size of population in need. For example, the cost of provision is typically related to population age, as the cost of serving the elderly is usually higher. Second, the before mentioned floor and ceiling provisions tend to benefit states that, based on their income per capita, should receive less than the floor. Interestingly, our empirical results confirm 1980, 1981, 1982,1990, 1991, 1992, 2000, 2001, and 2002. 2 these formula flaws. In particular, the fact that states in which income grows relatively quickly are advantaged in the allocation of Medicaid funds is consistent with inertia due to the floor and ceiling restrictions of the funding formula, which prevent the necessary adjustment to the changing distribution of income among the states. We also find that the amount of federal transfers for Medicaid is not significantly related to the states' shares of elderly and poor, thus suggesting that federal allocations do not reflect well the cost of serving population in need. 19 The financing of the Federal Highway Program is also problematic. The program formula (also still in place) was legislated in 1956 with the goal of funding the building of an Interstate Highway System. Hence, the limited responsiveness of funds to state population changes may be justified by the public nature of the infrastructure being built at the time. However, as pointed out by Sen. Hutchison, "The existing funding formula is no longer serving the best interests of each state or American motorists. With the Interstate Highway System long complete, our transportation mission should evolve to maintaining and improving this valuable infrastructure. We must add highway capacity in areas where population and commercial growth is exceeding what our infrastructure can withstand. Likewise, our funding structure must change to meet these shifting priorities." 20 In other words, the current formula -tailored to the public nature of a federal highway system construction -is not well suited to the maintenance and upgrading of an interstate infrastructure that is subject to congestion.
Although the Medicaid and Federal Highway formulas seem problematic in many re spects, it is not obvious that in general the rigidities embedded in formula must be harmful to the states. Many programs are financed by both federal and state spending, and local spending itself may respond slowly to population (Bradbury et al., 1984) . As a result, it might well be the case that federal spending is sluggish because federal funds adapt to the inertia in states' spending. If this is the case, we should, first, observe that state spending is negatively related to population dynamics and, second, that this stickiness is not caused by federal transfers. To verify if total state spending is also sticky, we estimate the effect of the population index over state spending per capita. If we do not control for federal transfers (Table 6 , column 1), we find that, in fact, state spending is also inversely related to population dynamics as indicated by the negative coeffi cient of index_ pop significant at 5 percent level. However, once we control for federal transfers, the coeffi cient of index_ pop loses its significance (Table 6 , column 2), meaning that stickiness in state expenditure is entirely due to the transfers. Since the OLS estimates including federal grants as an explanatory variable can evidently suffer from endogeneity bias (Knight, 2002) , in column 3 of Table 6 , we instrument grants per capita with the presidential politics explanatory variables that we used in Tables 3-5, and again the coeffi cient of index_ pop remains not significant. Hence, we conclude that the stickiness of federal transfers constrains state spending, thus preventing its adjustment to population growth.
IX. GAINERS AND LOSERS
In Table 7 we report the average gains and losses (in $1983) of federal funds for the 48 states implied by our estimates of the index_ pop coeffi cient reported in Table 4 . 21 These have been computed by comparing, for each state, the predicted federal grants per capita implied by the average index_ pop in the state during the period 1978-2008, with the federal grant per capita that the state would receive if its index_ pop were equal to the U.S. average during the same period.
Nevada, Arizona and Florida, with population growth rates over the period 1978-2008 equal to 1.9, 1.5 and 1.3 times the U.S. average, lose on average 41 percent, 19 percent, and 16 percent, respectively, of their average grant per capita. The sizes of the losses for the three fastest growing states are 37 percent, 14 percent, and 11 percent, respectively, of their average formula grant per capita. For the remaining states, gains and losses for total grants and formula grants are much lower. On the other hand, if we consider the Federal Highway programs, losses are higher. The three fastest growing states lose 39 percent (Nevada), 27 percent (Arizona), and 22 percent (Florida) of their average federal highway spending. Texas and California each lose 4 percent of their average spending, whereas New York gains about 3 percent. 22 Note that least populated states in the Northeast are advantaged in the allocation of federal grants, relative to populous states such as California, Texas, and Florida. These patterns conform to a claim made by Lee (1998) and Lee and Oppenheimer (1999) that the larger states grow faster. Since less funds are necessary to obtain the same increase in per capita grants in a relatively small state (Lee, 1998; Knight, 2004; Hauk and Wacziarg, 2007) , then senators and congressman who need to build winning coalitions to bring federal grants to their constituents will typically ask smaller states to enter the coalition in order to minimize the cost of obtaining political allies. Under this view, population growth and population size can be reduced to a single dimension. In reality, however, large states and fast growing states do not always coincide, which means that the bargaining process over formula-allocated grants cannot be reduced to one dimension.
Overall, we estimate that 17 of the 48 U.S. continental states -whose population grows faster than the U.S. average -lose federal grants (across all the different categories we have analyzed) to the advantage of the remaining states that grow at a slower pace. That the losses are concentrated in a minority of states may explain the persistence of the status quo. Not surprisingly, as discussed in the introduction, "fair share" legislative proposals tend to originate from representatives of fast growing states. These states are obviously a minority in the Senate and their overall representation in the House amounts today to 208 representatives, which is still a minority, although not by a large margin. However, 30 years ago after the 1980 Census, these same states only had 165 representatives. At current population growth rates, fast growing states may soon have a majority, at least in the House. Hence, we expect that in a not-so-distant future, stronger pressures will emerge in Congress to revise the formulas to better capture the needs of fast growing states. 23 In a trivial sense if state rankings in population growth remain broadly the same for a long period of time then fast growing states will also end up being the largest, therefore obtaining adequate representation in the House to re-balance formulas in their favor. 24 But it seems clear that it may take many decades to generate the political conditions for this to happen. And in any event the equal representation principle governing the 23 It is worth noting that fast growing states tend to have more Republican congressional representatives than the average U.S. state, particularly in the Senate. In the period analyzed, average yearly representation per state is fairly balanced (close to 50 percent Republican and 50 percent Democratic in both House and Senate). However, the 17 states penalized by a fast growing population are decidedly more Republican on average (54:46 in the House and 64:35 in the Senate). This higher than average party homogeneity could, in principle, favor the formation of a coalition when fast growing states will have a majority in the House. 24 For some interesting empirical findings on the "rebalancing role" of the House, see Knight (2008) and Hauk and Wacziarg (2007) who analyze the progression of appropriation bills throughout the entire legislative process and find that small states are advantaged in the Senate versions of bills, whereas this advantage disappears in the House versions.
Senate will still make any change diffi cult to achieve. The large number of veto players characterizing American politics remains probably an important reason why changes to the status quo are hard to implement (Tsebelis, 2002) .
X. CONCLUSIONS
Fast growing states are disadvantaged in the allocation of federal grants, in particular those allocated by formulas. As the populations of fast growing states increase, spending does not adjust suffi ciently to guarantee them their fair share of the benefi ts of federal programs. We quantify the effect of this inertia and show that it is sizable. For example, we estimate that Nevada, the fastest growing state, incurs a yearly loss equal to 41 percent of its overall grant budget. Formulas impose a constraint on the budgetary process, which prevents the spending adjustments necessary to address the changing needs of states with pronounced population dynamics.
What drives this budgetary inertia? Our simple theoretical framework shows that "sluggish spending" cannot be the outcome of pure social surplus maximization. At the same time, our empirical analysis highlights that, although several fast growing states are penalized by existing rules, the majority of the states benefi t from allocation according to existing formulas. In other words, a majority of the U.S. states seems to benefit from rules limiting the flexibility of the budget, and this suggests that distributive politics might provide an alternative explanation for why such rules persist. Hence, a political economy approach that calls into question the institutional arrangements and the political process behind grant allocation may be a fruitful avenue for future research on the causes of the observed misallocation of resources. In terms of our simple model, the government funding rule (summarized by the parameter γ ) could be endogenized as the outcome of simple majority voting, within a framework in which individuals have heterogeneous preferences and the preferences of the median voter dictate the parameter γ in the government objective function. The exact solution to a model of this sort would depend on a number of institutional details, for example on whether the "pivotal legislator" represents the median state (as in the Senate) or the median voter with respect to the overall voting population. In any event, there is no reason to expect such a solution to coincide with (or even be close to) the social surplus maximizing one.
This raises an intriguing question on the optimality of formula-based as opposed to discretionary spending programs. While formulas might be a useful instrument to reduce arbitrariness and promote a fair distribution of federal grants, they can also simply perpetuate a status quo, which turns out to be advantageous for a majority. Since the revision of such formulas cannot be isolated from the political process, they may become a further instrument through which political battles are fought. It is then surprising that the literature on grant allocation has focused mostly on the size of states, and therefore on the well known issue of small state over-representation in Senate, while entirely neglecting the important distributive consequences of population growth. More work is needed to shed light on these important issues.
